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We study one of the important elements of contract structure -- milestone payments in 
information technology development contracts. Outsourced technology development 
generally involves information asymmetry, conflicts of interest, and relationship-
specific efforts. Therefore, contractual opportunism such as adverse selection, moral 
hazard and shirking are among the major concerns for technology development 
partners. The paper examines how the structure of milestone payments reduces 
contractual uncertainty and opportunism and therefore decreases the likelihood of 
contract cancellation. Using data from over 350 technology development contracts 
across 14 countries we show that contracts with longer contract duration, high level of 
task uncertainty and complexity, and high dependence on developer’s proprietary 
technology are more likely to structure milestone payments and appropriate structure 
of milestone payments reduces the probability of contract cancellation. 
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Introduction 
Contract pricing and payment schedules are important elements of contract structure because of their 
potential impact on project value and performance (Dayanand et al. 2001). As Sookman (1989) explained 
in his work: “One technique commonly used in computer contracts to regulate the performance of the 
supplier and to facilitate acceptance is to condition payments to the supplier on performance “milestones” 
or “deliverables,” which are defined in the contract by corresponding functional and detailed 
specifications” (Sookman 1989: 2-39). Analytical research into contracts also suggested that properly 
structured progress payments such as milestone payments allow the client to ensure schedule compliance 
from the contract developer by offering these payments as incentives (Crama et al. 2008; Dayanand and 
Padman 2001; Lee et al. 1990). Generally, with milestone payments, the client only pays when the 
developers meets the milestone and staged requirements. This contingency-payment provides a couple of 
advantages.  On one hand, clients can screen the technology developers by offering a menu of payment 
structures from which the developer selects a particular contract, thus revealing his private information 
(Crama et al., 2008). On the other hand, they reduce the developer’s worry about the client expropriating 
sunk costs and induce the developer to increase effort in performing contractual obligations when the 
marginal product of the developer’s late stage effort is increasing in the early stage effort (Lee and Png 
1990; Png et al. 1999).   Moreover, the scheduled payment scheme allows the parties to adjust the 
technology development and functional requirements in response to new information.  Milestone 
payments function as a simple mechanism to align incentives and allow renegotiation.   
The importance of milestone payments is also highlighted in the empirical studies of technology licensing 
and transfer literature (Dechenaux et al. 2011). Yet recent research on IT contracts has focused primarily 
on the choice of contract pricing, i.e., fixed-costs and time & material pricing, in reducing opportunistic 
behaviors (Bajari et al. 2001; Crocker et al. 1988; Gopal et al. 2003, 2008). In contrast, payment 
scheduling problem has been less studied.  Our knowledge about when and how contract parties structure 
milestone payments are quite limited both empirically and theoretically. In addition, although the 
contract structure (e.g. payment scheme and schedule) has been proposed to be influential to the contract 
outcome or performance, the empirical studies of the association between this contract structures and 
performance are quite limited.  
Against this backdrop, we aim to examine how to structure milestone payments for technology 
development projects. By using more than 350 IT technology development contracts released by public 
companies on SEC filings, we empirically examine two research questions: (a) what are the determinants 
to the use of milestone payment; and (b) how does milestone payment affect the technology development 
performance (i.e., reducing the probability of contract cancellation)? In this article, we examine the 
project or task level factors that influence the payment structure and the performance consequences of 
this choice. Among the observed factors are task uncertainty (measured as technology breadth), expected 
duration of the contract, and the technology integration.  We also include a proxy measure of the moral 
hazard problem – dependence on developer’s proprietary technology in the estimation. The main finding 
of this empirical research is the existence of positive relationships of technology breadth, expected 
duration of contract, and developer’s proprietary technology with the probability of scheduling milestone 
payments. Furthermore, the milestone payment structure is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
early termination and cancellation of the IT technology development contracts.  
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Our contributions are twofold. First, we study payment structure and scheduling instead of pricing 
structure such as fixed or time & material payments. Many of the studies have examined determinants to 
contract structures and focused on the pricing structure. But only a few researches examine how the 
proposed contract structures affect the contract outcome and performance. The empirical analysis of the 
contract data in this study enriches our limited knowledge. Second, we obtain a relatively large sample of 
contract data to study the contract structures in practice. The coding mechanism we developed to analyze 
rich textual contents in contracts is applicable to study other types of technology agreements, thus, 
provides a mechanism for IS scholar to get access to legal data.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we review the literature and develop the 
research hypotheses.  The following sections then present the data collection and empirical analysis and 
results. We conclude the paper with a discussion of implications for research and practice, as well as 
limitations and direction for future work.    
Theory and Hypotheses 
The theoretical literature has considered the problems inherent to the technology development and 
transfer. Arrow (1963) identified a double-sided moral hazard problem in the technology transmission. 
One the one hand, the developer may shirk on his development effort when there is no effective 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism. On the other hand, client may renege on payments and further 
initiate renegotiation once developer has put relationship-specific investment on development projects. 
These two sided moral hazard problems will lead risk-averse contract partners to under-invest their 
efforts on technology development. Milestone payments arise as a means to provide parties with the right 
incentives to perform costly relationship-specific actions.  
Focused on these principal-agent problems, Lee and Png (1990) developed an analytical model and 
showed that, in situations of moral hazard and specific investments, performance would improve with 
division of the work into stages and payment by milestones.  For the developer, the payment by 
milestones reduces the sunk cost outstanding at any particular time, and hence reduces the scope for the 
client to engage in ex-post renegotiation.  For the client, to the extent that the developer’s effort in the 
various stages is complementary (more effort by the developer in an earlier stage would raise the marginal 
product of effort in later stages), then division of the work into stages with payment by milestones would 
raise the developer’s effort. 
Whang (1992) modeled software development outsourcing as a multi-stage process and proposed optimal 
contract structures that align the incentives of the contracting parties. Szmerekovsky (2005) used net 
present value (NPV) maximization model to analyze client’s payment-scheduling problem when there 
were concerns about developer’s opportunistic behavior.  
Dey, et al. (2010) considered a setting where the parties could receive new information over time.  The 
client would benefit by dividing the work into two stages – a prototyping stage during which the client can 
get better information about the value of the project, and a second stage in which the development effort 
would be tuned to the new information.  They showed that the client would prefer staged development 
when its uncertainty about the project value is larger.   
Recent research on university technology licensing also explored the technology developer’s moral hazard 
and the role of contracts. Crama et al. (2008) show that risk-averse licensor and the information 
asymmetry play important roles in determining optimal contracts when upfront fees, milestone payments 
and royalties are feasible. Dechenaux et al. (2011) examined the use of a variety of payment types 
including milestones, annual payments and royalties. They found that milestone payments were positively 
related to the importance of inventor effort in the development process.  
These studies provide guidelines to anticipate what factors are associated with use of milestone payments. 
The importance of inventor effort and the task attributes such as task uncertainties, contract length, and 
task complexity all are important to the structure of milestone payments.  
Task uncertainty. IT development is an inherently uncertain process. Uncertainties in technology 
requirements, project costs and value of the projects have been identified as significant variables that 
characterize risks in an IT development project (Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza 2003; Whang 1992). 
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Projects that are difficult to predict in advance the behavior of the elements in the tasks pose even greater 
risks and uncertainty. A development for next generation technology is perceived as having a high level of 
technology risks when it involves novelty of task elements and the contract partners lack of knowledge 
about the general process to accomplish the project or are unsure about eventual project outcomes 
(Tatikonda et al. 2000). As a result, a risk-averse developer and client would prefer to use milestone 
payments to share the risks in such cases. Therefore, we expect    
Hypothesis 1: Contracts for next generation technology are more likely to include milestone payments. 
Contract length.  In technology development projects, no matter how careful the parties are in 
developing the detailed specifications, there will always be changes made to the ongoing project. Over a 
longer period of time, there are more possible stages of performance over which the marginal benefit of 
the developer’s later stage effort is increasing in the early stage effort.  There are also likely to be more 
changes in technology and the business environment and more information revealed to client and 
developer (Joskow 1987).  Accordingly, the benefit from milestone payments would be larger, which leads 
to  
Hypothesis 2:  Contracts for longer projects are more likely to include milestone payments. 
Technology integration. Organizational design and project management literature have empirically 
investigated relationships between the nature of the task and the structure of inter-firm relationship 
governance. Van de Ven et al. (1979) found that the number of product functions embodied in the product 
increases information-processing requirements. In the same vein, Gulati and Singh (1998) and Bensauou 
and Anderson (1999) find that technology integration, which represents the number of technologies in the 
development effort, contributes to coordination requirements between contract partners. Casciaro (2003) 
further posited that task integration may create obstacles to coordination and cooperation and therefore 
pose contract parties to moral hazard and opportunistic risks. The opportunistic risks and the 
coordination requirements induce contract partners to structure payment mechanisms. Therefore, we 
expect that 
Hypothesis 3: Contracts for technology integration of software and hardware design are more likely to 
include milestone payments.  
Developer proprietary technology. IT technology development requires intensive knowledge 
sharing and technology transfer between contract parties. However, inherent to any inter-firm transfer of 
technology, there is an issue of asymmetric information. When the technology development project is 
based on the developer’s proprietary technology as background technology, the developer is better 
acquainted with the technology to be included in the development project. He will be able to better assess 
the value (Aron et al. 2005) and quality of the developed technologies.  It is often difficult for client firm to 
observe the effort of a developer and to define verifiable measures for evaluating the developer’s 
performance. The asymmetric information may induce moral hazard problem because the developer may 
“shirk” and may not undertake the appropriate level of effort. Client firms who foresee this kind of moral 
hazard will include milestone payments to induce developer’s cooperation. In the same time, payment 
based on completion of the development milestone gives client firm more controls on the development 
progresses.  
Hypothesis 4: The higher the dependence of development on developer’s proprietary technology, the 
contract would be more likely to include milestone payments. 
Contract cancellation. In technology development contract, most of time it is extremely difficult for 
contract parties to predict that the development will be successful or the project will become profitable. In 
addition to that, contracting for third party developer’s technology development becomes problematic 
when the project success depends on the developer’s effort and capabilities which are unable to be 
evaluated and assessed. Each of these contracting difficulties outlined above either generates additional 
costs or increases the likelihood of suboptimal project outcomes such as project abandonment. Therefore, 
the probability of early termination of development contract will be higher when any of these factors is 
present. Milestone payments provide contract parties, especially the client who finances the development 
project, a mechanism to evaluate the technology development progress and make necessary adjustment to 
their original development target and plan. Hence, we hypothesize that 
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Hypothesis 5: When the task uncertainty is high, milestone payment will result in lower likelihood of 
early termination than lump-sum payment. 
Data 
Our principal source of data for the study was filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) augmented by information from annual reports (ICC full-text annual reports for international 
company profiles, and B-FIND U.S. and Canadian public and private company information).   SEC 
Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. Part 229) requires publicly-listed companies to disclose “material contract” to 
the public.  A contract is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in making an investment decision (SEC Regulation S-K and S-B Item 601(b)(10)). 
We searched SEC filings over the period 1992 to 2009, inclusive.  S&P North American Technology Sector 
Index covers the following industries: technology, computer services, computer hardware and peripherals, 
Internet software & Service, Internet retail, communications equipment, semiconductors, and software 
industries. We collected contracts filed by the companies in these industries. This search yielded 353 IT 
technology development contracts. We extracted the following data from the contracts: (1) contract date 
and year; (2) contract length; (3) client and developer’s headquarter locations; (4) task description  and 
the purpose of the technology development; (5) the dependence of the project on vendor’s proprietary 
technologies; and (6) milestone payments -- whether the contract specified payment by milestone.   
We supplemented the contracts with information about contract value, prior and post contract 
transactions between client and developer from the company’s 10-K financial statements and press 
releases published by Dow Jones Interactive, Factiva and Lexis.com.  For 351 of the 353 contracts, we 
procured a complete history of prior and post contract transactions from the 10-K reports of the developer 
or client.  We further collected financial performance data about client firms and client firm’s SIC industry 
code from COMPUSTAT.  
These 353 contracts involve 312 client organizations. The majority of firms in the sample have only one 
contract. The remaining firms have anywhere from two to five contracts in the sample. We excluded those 
deals that are solely technology licensing agreements. To ensure coding consistency and reliability, two 
undergraduate students independently coded all the contracts and complementary financial statements 
and news releases.  Examples of sample provisions from actual contracts and news reports were provide 
to the coders. We checked the inter-coder reliabilities for all variable coding and found them to be high 
(Cohen’s k=0.85 or above). 
In our sample, 136 of the contracts in our sample included contract value, ranging from a maximum 
exceeding $600 million to a minimum of $7250, with an average of $29.81 million. A majority are long-
term deal (i.e., contract duration is more than one year). The average contract length was around four 
years from the contract date. Forty percent of the client firms operated primary in IT industries. Forty-
seven percent of the contracts were signed after Year 2001, which means that around half of the sample 
contracts were not for solving the Year 2000 problems. Around 37% of the agreements involved next 
generation technology development, covering a broad spectrum of purposes, from development of new 
microprocessor based on existing technology to developing a “next generation” printed circuit board. A 
minority are cross-border deals, involving firms headquartered in different countries. More than half of 
the contracts specified payments contingent on technical success in stages. Table 1 provides detailed 
descriptions of the deals and client firm characteristics.  
Preliminary Analysis Results 
We first analyze the associations between task attributes and milestone payments. Given that the 
milestone payments were coded as binary, a probit analysis would be an appropriate econometric method 
of testing the association between milestone payments and measures of uncertainties and contractual 
opportunism. As hypothesized, we identified four elements that likely increase the technology 
development uncertainties and complexity of the development tasks: (1) technology breadth; (2) contract 
duration; and (3) technology integration. We used developer proprietary technology as proxy measures of 
moral hazard problem. In addition to these explanatory variables, we also included the following control 
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variables in the model: (a) IT client; (b) size of the contract measured as value of development projects; 
(c) year dummy to control the other events when contract was signed; (d) cross-border deal; and (e) client 
size measured as net sale gained by client firm in the year before the contract signed. The descriptions of 
variables are provided in Table2. Table 3 provides the correlations of these variables. None of these 
variables are highly correlated.   
Table 1 Deal and Firm Description 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Deal value (in millions) 136 29.81 100.84 0.01 600.00 
Technology breadth 353 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Cross-border development 343 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Technology integration 353 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Vendor's background technology 343 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
IT client 353 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Year dummy 353 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Client firm size (total assets in millions) 164 17.04 49.01 0.00 332.64 
Client firm size (total sales in millions) 165 10.37 25.13 0.00 152.64 
Client firm R&D spending (in millions) 49 0.92 2.91 0.00 18.44 
Contract length (in months) 301 47.88 36.45 1.00 120.00 
Contract length (binary) 353 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Prior deal exists  351 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Milestone payments 351 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Early termination 89 0.35 0.32 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 2 Explanation of Variables  





=1, if the task description and the purpose of 
the development was to develop next 
generation technologies; otherwise, =0 
Task description & 
purpose of 
development specified 
in contract, firm’s 





=1, if the duration of development project was 
more than 12 months; otherwise, =0   




=1, if the technologies to be developed include 
both hardware and software and the 
integration of both; otherwise =0 







=1, if the background technology for the 
development was originally owned by the 
vendor; otherwise =0 




=1, if the vendor was paid by the milestone 
achievement; =0 if the vendor was by the lump 
sum payment or by loyalty. 
Contract document - 
Control variables 
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IT client Binary (0/1) 
=1, if the client industry is in IT sector such as 
computer hardware, computer software, 
electronics, communications, and 





=1, if the contract was signed after Year 2000, 
=0, if the contract year was before Year 2000 




=1, if the technology was developed outside of 
client’s country; =0, if the technology was 





value (in $ 
million) 
Numerical  
The value of the technology development deal.  









The value of the net sales of client firm in the 





=1, if the contract specified that developers 
were paid by milestone payments; otherwise 
=0. 
Contract document Dependent 





=, if the contract was early terminated (i.e., 
cancelled); =0 if the contract was completed. 
Firm’s SEC financial 
statement 
Dependent 
variable in the 
second stage 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics and Correlations (n=116) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Tech breadth 1.00                
2. Contract length 0.00 1.00              
3. Cross-border deal 0.16 -0.01 1.00            
4. Technology integration 0.17 -0.16 0.16 1.00          
5. Vendor proprietary tech -0.08 0.16 -0.11 -0.11 1.00        
6. IT client -0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 1.00      
7. Year dummy -0.04 0.02 0.11 0.17 0.11 -0.38 1.00    
8. Contract value (in $million) 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 1.00  
9. Milestone payment 0.16 0.25 0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.03  
10. Client size (net sale) 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.001 -0.17 -0.06 -0.17 0.19 0.13 
 
Table 4 reports probit estimates with robust standard error. Column 1 includes the explanatory variables 
measuring task uncertainty, task complexity, and the information asymmetry. Column 2 – 5 add the four 
control variables one by one to the estimations. Across the five probit analysis, three patterns emerge. 
First, the coefficient of technology breadth was positive and significant.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
projects for next generation technology development are more likely to structure milestone payments. 
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2, projects with longer development time presented higher level of 
task complexity and are associated with greater development effort. The parties were more likely to use 
milestone payments to share the risks.  However, the other measure of task complexity, technology 
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integration, was not significant. It is possible that our binary coding of this variable by differentiating pure 
software projects and the ones involving both hardware and software developments didn’t capture the real 
complexity of technology developments in terms of subtask interactions. Refined coding method is 
needed to measure the task inter-dependence and magnitude of subtasks posed by the project.    
The coefficient of developer proprietary technology was positive and significant.   This result was 
consistent with Hypothesis 4 that, when the project is based on the developer’s proprietary technology, 
the developer’s effort is an important factor determining the technical success and the costs of 
development. Milestone payments are used to assure developer cooperation.  Among the control 
variables, the coefficient of IT client was also positive and significant when we controlled year dummy and 
client size.  IT client companies have more experience and knowledge about the technology they intend to 
develop compared to non-IT client firms. Therefore, IT clients know how to structure the technology 
development schedules and associated payment amounts well and it takes them less costs in designing 
milestones payments.  
We also analyze the effect of milestone payments on the contract outcome.  The contract outcomes were 
coded as binary (i.e., =1 if the contract was cancelled or early terminated; otherwise =0). Our analysis may 
have the problem of endogenous matching. To control the potential endogeneity problems, we use a 
generalized least squares estimator (AGLS) (Newey 1987) to test the association between milestone 
payments and contract outcome. As hypothesized, the milestone payment is negatively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of contract early termination. The contract length, developer’s proprietary 
technology are also significantly related (Table 4 Column 6).  
Discussion and Future Research Plan 
Our findings have obvious managerial implications for inter-organizational technology collaboration.  Our 
results suggest that in the presence of opportunism and high task uncertainty and complexity inherent in 
IT technology development, milestone payments may be used not only to solve moral hazard problems 
with the developer, but also to function as a risk-sharing mechanism between contract partners.  We show 
that when development requires developer effort and commitment in the project, but these inputs are not 
observable and difficult to assess, payments tied to the achievement of technical milestones are necessary 
to obtain developer cooperation. Our results also suggest that when a technology development project has 
a high level of technology risk scheduling milestone payments will allocate risks among the partners. 
Specifically, milestone payments are prevalent in development projects having the novelty of task 
elements and taking a relatively long time to complete.  Risk and unobservable effort are inherent 
characteristics of the technology development environment. Appropriate structure of contract payment 
will reduce the probability of contract cancel and early termination. To the extent that companies are 
concerned about the value of the development and the magnitude of the payments gained from the 
contracts, a well-designed contract plays a critical role in cross-companies technology development and 
transfer. Our analysis adds to our understanding of how companies deal with the riskiness of IT 
technologies as well as the need to obtain developer collaboration by using milestone payments.     
We acknowledge that the major limitation of our study is that the data were limited to information 
disclosed in SEC filings and complementary sources including databases of newspapers.  These sources 
provided very little detail about the number of milestones and the amount of each milestone.  With such 
information, we could have conducted a more detailed and richer analysis.   
The SEC filings and complementary sources provided little background information about the developers 
and clients.  For listed companies, we could match to Compustat and compile financial information.  
However, the majority of the developers and clients were unlisted, so we could not obtain any financial 
information.  We were unable to collect any information about the cost of the work, and hence, we do not 
know the profit earned.   
An important direction for future research would be to compile more detailed and richer information 
about technology development contracts and the backgrounds of the developers and clients.  Such 
information would enable a more detailed and richer analysis of the use of milestone payments. With 
richer information, we can test what other factors influence the contract structure in terms of milestone 
payment and how this contract structure will influence the technology development outcome. 
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Table 4 Data Analysis Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES      Early 
Termination 
Technology breath 0.172* 0.183* 0.530** 0.550** 0.686*** 0.500 
(=1 if “next generation”) (0.143) (0.151) (0.237) (0.241) (0.258) (0.323) 
Contract length 0.611*** 0.676*** 0.819** 0.822*** 0.737** 0.738** 
(=1 if >1year) (0.209) (0.218) (0.320) (0.317) (0.350) (0.309) 
Technology integration -0.004 -0.005 -0.026 -0.024 -0.045 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) 
Developer’s proprietary 
tech 
0.553*** 0.589*** 0.603** 0.581** 0.818*** 0.636** 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.288) (0.288) (0.316) (0.285) 
IT client 0.218 0.213 0.416 0.498* 0.697** 0.035 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.258) (0.287) (0.302) (0.116) 
Cross-border deal  -0.061 0.061 0.029 0.316 -0.085 
  (0.189) (0.300) (0.303) (0.339) (0.144) 
Contract value (in 
millions) 
  -0.000 -0.000 0.020 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Year dummy    0.241 0.295 0.021 
(=1 if contract year 
<2001) 
   (0.274) (0.302) (0.078) 
Milestone payments      -2.349*** 
      (0.364) 
Client size      -1.720  
(net sales, in millions)     (2.110)  
Constant  -0.957*** -1.087*** -1.217*** -1.570*** 0.479 
  (0.245) (0.409) (0.448) (0.495) (0.384) 
Observations 341 333 129 129 116 86 
Chi-square 24.09 26.94 18.25 18.17 25.59 85.20 
Log likelihood -221.65 -214.9 -76.35 -75.92 -65.867 -68.45 
Note: the number of observations decreases due to missing value in some variables 




Aron, R., Clemons, E.K., and Reddi, S. "Just right outsourcing: Understanding and managing risk," 
Journal of Management Information Systems (22:2) 2005, pp 37-55. 
Arrow, K.J. "Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care," The American Economic Review 
(53:5) 1963, pp 941-973. 
Bajari, P., and Tadelis, S. "Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts," RAND 
Journal of Economics (32:3) 2001, pp 387-407. 
Bensaou, M., and Anderson, E. "Buyer-supplier relations in industrial markets: when do buyers risk 
making idiosyncratic investments?," Organization Science (10) 1999, pp 460-481. 
Casciaro, T. "Determinants of governance structures in alliances: the role of strategic, task and partner 
uncertainties," Industrial and Corporate Change (12:6) 2003, pp 1223-1251. 
Crama, P., Reyck, B.D., and Degraeve, Z. "Milestone payments or royalties? Contract design for R&D 
licensing," Operations Research (56:6) 2008, pp 1539-1552. 
Economics and Value of IS 
10 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
Crocker, K.J., and Masten, S.E. "Mitigating contractual hazards: Unilateral options and contract length," 
RAND Journal of Economics (19:3) 1988, pp 327-343. 
Dayanand, N., and Padman, R. "project contracts and payment schedules: The client's problem," 
Management Science (47:12) 2001, pp 1654-1667. 
Dechenaux, E., Thursby, J., and Thursby, M. "Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: The role of 
contracts," Research Policy (40:1) 2011, pp 94-104. 
Dey, D., and Fan, M. "Design and analysis of contracts for software outsourcing," Information Systems 
Research (21:1) 2010, pp 93-114. 
Gopal, A., and Sivaramakrishnan, K. "Contracts in offshore software development: An empirical analysis," 
Management Science (49:12) 2003, pp 1671-1683. 
Gopal, A., and Sivaramakrishnan, K. "On vendor preferences for contract types in offshore software 
projects: The case of fixed price vs. time and materials contracts," Information Systems Research 
(19:2) 2008, pp 202-220. 
Gulati, R., and Singh, H. "The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and 
appropriation concerns in strategic alliances," Administrative Science Quarterly (43) 1998, pp 781-
814. 
Joskow, P.L. "Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal 
markets," American Economic Review (77:1) 1987, pp 168-185. 
Lee, T.K., and Png, I.P.L. "The role of installment payments in contracts for services," RAND Journal of 
Economics (21:1) 1990, pp 83-99. 
Newey, W. “Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous explanatory 
variables”, Journal of Econometrics (36) 1987, pp 231-250.  
Png, I.P.L., and Tao, Z. "Installment payments in contracts for systems development," SSRN 1999. 
Schwartz, E.S., and Zozaya-Gorostiza, C. "Investment under uncertainty in information technology: 
Acquisition and development projects," Management Science (49:1) 2003, pp 57-70. 
Sookman, B.B. Computer, Internet and Electronic Commerce Law Carswell, Toronto, Canada, 1989. 
Szmerekovsky, J.G. "The impact of contractor behavior on the client's payment-scheduling problem," 
Management Science (51:4) 2005, pp 629-640. 
Tatikonda, M.V., and Rosenthal, S.R. "Technology novelty, project complexity, and product development 
project execution success: A deeper look at task uncertainty in product innovation," Ieee 
Transactions on Engineering Management (47:1) 2000, pp 74-87. 
Van de Ven, A.H., Walker, G., and Liston, J. "Coordination patterns within an interorganizational 
network," Human Relations (32) 1979, pp 19-36. 
Whang, S. "Contracting for Software Development," Management Science (38:3) 1992, pp 307-324. 
  
 
 
